From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



States and Territories of the Arab League

Arab League

Pan-Arabism is an ideology espousing the unification of the countries of North Africa and West Asia from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea, referred to as the Arab World. It is closely connected to Arab nationalism, which asserts that the Arabs constitute a single nation. Its popularity was at its height during the 1950s and 1960s. Advocates of pan-Arabism have often espoused socialist principles and strongly opposed Western political involvement in the Arab world. It also sought to empower Arab states from outside forces by forming alliances and, to a lesser extent, economic co-operation.[1]


Origins and development

The origins of pan-Arabism are often attributed to Jurji Zaydan (died 1914) and his Nahda (Revival) movement. Zaydan had critical influence on acceptance of a modernized version of the Quranic Arabic language as the universal written and official language throughout the Arab world, instead of adoption of local dialects in the various countries. He also popularized through his historical novels certain heroes from Arab history. Pan-Arabism was first pressed by Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, who sought independence for the Mashreq Arabs from the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment of a unified Arab state in the Mashreq. In 1915–16, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence resulted in an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Sharif that if the Mashreq Arabs revolted successfully against the Ottomans, the United Kingdom would support claims for Mashreq Arab independence. In 1916, however, the Sykes-Picot Agreement between the United Kingdom and France determined that parts of the Mashreq would be divided between those powers rather than forming part of an independent Arab state. When the Ottoman Empire surrendered in 1918, the United Kingdom refused to keep to the letter of its arrangements with Hussein,[2] and the two nations assumed guardianship of Mesapotamia, Lebanon, Palestine and what became modern Syria. Ultimately, Hussein only became King of Hijaz in the then less strategically valuable south, but lost his Caliphate throne when the kingdom was sacked by the Najdi Ikhwan forces of the Saudites and forcefully incorporated into the newly created Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).


The Arab world

A more formalized pan-Arab ideology than that of Hussein was first espoused in the 1930s, notably by Syrian thinkers such as Constantin Zureiq, Zaki al-Arsuzi and Michel Aflaq. Aflaq and al-Arsuzi were key figures in the establishment of the Arab Ba’ath (Renaissance) Party, and the former was for long its chief ideologist, combining elements of Marxist thought with a nationalism to a considerable extent reminiscent of nineteenth-century European romantic nationalism. It's been said that Arsuzi was fascinated with the Nazi ideology of "racial purity" and impacted Aflaq.[3][4][5]

Abdallah of Jordan dreamed of uniting Syria, Palestine, and Jordan under his leadership in what he would call Greater Syria. He proposed a plan to this effect to Britain, which controlled Palestine at that time, but to no avail. The plan was not popular among the majority of Arabs and fostered distrust among the leaders of the other Middle Eastern countries against Abdallah. This distrust of Abdallah's expansionist aspirations was one of the principal reasons for the founding of the Arab League in 1945.[6] Once Abdallah was assassinated by a Palestinian nationalist in 1951, the vision of Greater Syria was dropped from the Jordanian agenda.[1]

The pan-Arabist ideology has been accused of inciting prejudice against or downplaying the role of ethnic minorities, such as the Berbers.[7] Although pan-Arabism began at the time of World War I, Egypt, the most populous and arguably most important Arabic-speaking country, was not interested in pan-Arabism prior to the 1950s. Thus, in the 1930s and 1940s, Egyptian nationalism—and not pan-Arabism—was the dominant mode of expression of Egyptian political activists. According to James Jankowski, "What is most significant [about Egypt in this period] is the absence of an Arab component in early Egyptian nationalism. The thrust of Egyptian political, economic, and cultural development throughout the nineteenth century worked against, rather than for, an 'Arab' orientation.... This situation—that of divergent political trajectories for Egyptians and Arabs—if anything increased after 1900."[8]

Attempts at Arab union


Under Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, pan-Arabism dominated politics in the 1950s and 1960s

It was not until the Gamal Abdel Nasser era that Arab nationalism (in addition to Arab socialism) became a state policy and a means with which to define Egypt's position in the Middle East and the world,[9][10] usually articulated vis-à-vis Zionism in the neighboring Jewish state of Israel.

There have been several attempts to bring about a pan-Arab state by many well known Arab leaders, all of which ultimately resulted in failure. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden called for Arab unity during the 1940s, and this was followed by specific proposals from pro-British leaders, including King Abdullah of Transjordan and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said of Iraq, but Egyptian proposals for a broader grouping of independent Arab states prevailed with the establishment of the League of Arab States, a regional international organization, in 1945. In large part representing the popularity Nasser had gained among the masses in the Arab world following the Suez crisis, the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 was the first case of the actual merger of two previously independent Arab countries. Hastily formed under President Nasser's leadership (but on the initiative of Syrian leaders who feared a takeover by communists or "reactionaries" and hoped to lead the new entity), the UAR was a unitary state, not a federal union, with its critics seeing this as hardly more than a small country being annexed by a larger one. It lasted until 1961, when Syrian army officers carried out a coup d'état and withdrew from the union. With the popular dream of unity still a popular force that politicians often thought they had to give lip service to, Egypt, Syria and Iraq entered into an abortive agreement in 1963 to form a new "United Arab Republic," which was to be entirely federal in structure, leaving each member state its identity and institutions."[1] After 1961, Egypt continued to give lip service to the idea of Arab unity by continuing to call itself "the UAR" but changed its name to "Arab Republic of Egypt" in 1973. [11]

Also in 1958, a monarchist rival, the Arab Federation, was founded between Jordan and Iraq. But due to tensions with the UAR and the 14 July Revolution, the Arab Federation collapsed after only six months. Another attempt, the United Arab States, existed as a confederation between the United Arab Republic, Arab Federation and the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen but it dissolved in 1961.

Two later attempts represented the enthusiasm of Libya's Muammar Gaddafi; these were the Federation of Arab Republics which lasted five years and the Arab Islamic Republic which never emerged in practice. Aside from the forcible unification of much of the Arabian Peninsula by the Saudi rulers of Najd during the 1920s, the unity of seven Arab emirates that form the United Arab Emirates and the unification of North Yemen and South Yemen stand today as rare examples of actual unification. The current Syrian government is – and the former government of Iraq was – led by rival factions of the Ba’ath Party, which continues to espouse pan-Arabism and is organized in several other countries.


The Arab defeat by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War and the inability of pan-Arabist governments to generate economic growth severely damaged the credibility of pan-Arabism as a relevant ideology. "By the mid-1970s," according to The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East, "the idea of Arab unity became less and less apparent in Arab politics, though it remained a wishful goal among the masses."[1]

The Egyptians' attachment to pan-Arabism was particularly questioned after the Six-Day War. Nasser had overplayed his hand in trying to form a pan-Arab hegemony under himself. Thousands of Egyptians had lost their lives and the country became disillusioned with Arab politics.[12] The Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978 further fractured the Arabic-speaking countries. Nasser's successor Anwar Sadat, both through public policy and his peace initiative with Israel, revived an uncontested Egyptian orientation, unequivocally asserting that only Egypt and Egyptians were his responsibility. The terms "Arab", "Arabism," and "Arab unity" became conspicuously absent.[13]

By the late 1980s, pan-Arabism began to be eclipsed by both nationalist and Islamist ideologies. In the 1990s, many voiced their opposition to pan-Arabism.[citation needed]

Egyptian critics of Arab nationalism contend that it has worked to erode and/or relegate native Egyptian identity by superimposing only one aspect of Egypt's culture. These views and sources for collective identification in the Egyptian state are captured in the words of a linguistic anthropologist who conducted fieldwork in Cairo:

Historically, Egyptians have considered themselves as distinct from 'Arabs' and even at present rarely do they make that identification in casual contexts; il-'arab [the Arabs] as used by Egyptians refers mainly to the inhabitants of the Gulf states... Egypt has been both a leader of pan-Arabism and a site of intense resentment towards that ideology. Egyptians had to be made, often forcefully, into "Arabs" [during the Nasser era] because they did not historically identify themselves as such. Egypt was self-consciously a nation not only before pan-Arabism but also before becoming a colony of the British Empire. Its territorial continuity since ancient times, its unique history as exemplified in its pharaonic past and later on its Coptic language and culture, had already made Egypt into a nation for centuries. Egyptians saw themselves, their history, culture and language as specifically Egyptian and not "Arab."[14]



1.                               ^ Jump up to: a b c d "Arab Unity." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002. pp. 160–166.

2.                               Jump up ^ Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, Beverly Milton-Edwards, Polity Press, 2006, p. 57-59

3.                               Jump up ^ The Syrian Arab Republic: a handbook, Anne Sinai, Allen Pollack, 1976, p. 45

4.                               Jump up ^ Google Books

5.                               Jump up ^ Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism: the continuing debate by Tawfic Farah, Publisher Westview Press, 1987, p. 37

6.                               Jump up ^ Sela, Avraham. "Arab League." Sela. The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. 147-150.

7.                               Jump up ^ Pelham, Nick. "Moroccan Berbers press for rights." BBC News. 2 January 2001. 18 November 2010.

8.                               Jump up ^ Jankowski, James. "Egypt and Early Arab Nationalism" in Rashid Khalidi, ed. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, pp. 244–45

9.                               Jump up ^ For more information, see Aburish, Said K. (2004), Nasser, the Last Arab, New York City: St. Martin's Press, ISBN 978-0-312-28683-5

10.                           Jump up ^ "Before Nasser, Egypt, which had been ruled by Britain since 1882, was more in favor of territorial, Egyptian nationalism and distant from the pan-Arab ideology. Egyptians often did not identify themselves primarily as Arabs, and it is revealing that when the Egyptian nationalist leader [Saad Zaghlul] met the Arab delegates at Versailles in 1918, he insisted that their struggles for statehood were not connected, claiming that the problem of Egypt was an Egyptian problem and not an Arab one." Makropoulou, Ifigenia. Pan - Arabism: What Destroyed the Ideology of Arab Nationalism?. Hellenic Center for European Studies. January 15, 2007.

11.                           Jump up ^ "United Arab Republic (UAR)." Sela. The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. 873-874.

12.                           Jump up ^ Dawisha, p. 237

13.                           Jump up ^ Dawisha, pp. 264-65, 267

  1. Jump up ^ Haeri, Niloofar. Sacred language, Ordinary People: Dilemmas of Culture and Politics in Egypt. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2003, pp. 47, 136.



From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Distribution of the Turkic peoples


Distribution of the countries and autonomous subdivisions where a Turkic language has official status.


The flag of the Turkic Council

Pan-Turkism is a movement that emerged in the 1880s among the Turkic intellectuals of Azerbaijan (part of the Russian Empire at that time ) and Ottoman Empire, with the aim of cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples.[1][2][3][4][5]



In the research literature, the term "Pan-Turkism" is used to describe the idea of political, cultural and ethnic unity of all Turkic-speaking people. Turanism is a closely related movement but a more general term than Turkism, since Turkism applies only to the Turkic peoples. However, researchers and politicians engaged in the field of Turkic ideology have used these terms interchangeably in a multitude of sources and literature.[6] The term "Turkism" started to be used with a prefix "Pan" (from Greek πᾶν, pan = all), for a "Panturkism".[7]

While the various Turkic peoples often share historical, cultural and linguistic roots, the rising of a pan-Turkic political movement is a phenomenon only of the 19th and 20th centuries[8] and can be seen in parallel with European developments like Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism or with Pan-Iranism. Proponents use the latter most often as a point of comparison as the concept of "Turkic" is not a true racial or ethnic description but more of a linguistic and cultural distinction. This is to differentiate it from the term "Turkish" which is more of an ethnic/racial term for the citizens and denizens primarily residing in Turkey. Pan-Turkic ideas and "re-unification" movements have been popular since the collapse of the Soviet Union in Central Asian and other Turkic countries.



Pan-Turkic rally in Istanbul, March 2009

In 1804, Tatar theologian Kursavi wrote a treatise calling for Islam’s modernization. Kursavi was a founder of the religious thought of Jadidism (from Arabic 'jadid', which means 'new'). The idea of Jadidism was encouragement of critical thinking, as opposed to insistence on unquestioning loyalty. It supported education for Muslims and promoted equality among the sexes; advocated tolerance for other faiths, Turkic cultural unity, and openness to Europe’s cultural legacy.[9] In 1843 in Kazan the Jadid movement was created. Its aim was a semi-secular modernization and educational reform, and within Jadid for the first time sprout the idea of a national, and not religious identity of the Turks. Before that they were solely Muslim subjects of Russia, and the Empire continued this attitude to its very collapse.[10]

Following the upsurge in Russian colonization of the Volga area in 1880s, the Islamic social movement Jaddidism added motives of national-liberation. However, as a result of the increase of imperial tendencies within the Russian Empire's internal politics after 1907, many partisans of Turkic unity immigrated to the Ottoman Empire.

The newspaper Türk in Cairo was established by exiles from the Ottoman Empire following the suspension of the 1876 constitution and the persecution of liberal intellectuals. It was the first publication to use the ethnic designation as a title.[11] Yusuf Akçura chose this paper to publish his infamous "Three types of policy" (Üç tarz-ı siyaset), anonymously in 1904, and was the earliest manifesto of a truly Pan-Turkic nationalism, not just Ottoman-Turkish nationalism.[11] In it he argues that the supra-ethnic union espoused by Ottomism was unrealistic, as was the "French liberal" model was already outdated by the "German national" model based on race. Lastly, the Pan-Islamic model had its advantages, but supporters would have to face the reality the majority of Muslim populations were currently under colonial rule, which would oppose unification.

He concludes that the "Turkish political nation" based on ethnicity is unprecedented and would require active cultivation of cultural history and national identity. Given the territory of the Ottoman Empire at the time, a Pan-Turkish empire would require withdrawal of the Balkans and Eastern Europe and the annexation of much of Central Asia. The first publication of "Three types of policy" was met with negative reactions, and it became much more influential towards its third publication in 1911 in Istanbul. The Ottoman Empire had lost its African territory to Italy and would soon lose the Balkans, an Pan-Turkish nationalism became a more feasible and popular political strategy.

In 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress came to power in Ottoman Turkey, and the Ottoman Empire turned toward nationalistic ideology. This contrasted with the largely Muslim ideology of the Empire dating back to the 16th century, where the sultan was a caliph for the part of the Muslim lands under his control. From Russia, the exiled Enlightenment leaders espousing Pan-Turkism fled to Istanbul, where a powerful Pan-Turkic movement rose. From that time, the Turkish Pan-Turkic movement grew into a nationalistic, ethnically-oriented replacement of the Caliphate by a worldwide state. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire with its multi-cultural and multi-ethnic population, influenced by emerging racial theories and Turkish nationalism of the Young Turks, some tried to replace the lost empire with a new Turkish commonwealth. But leaders such as Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) acknowledged that such a goal was impossible at the time and reluctantly replaced Pan-Turkic idealism with solely Anatolian nationalism aimed at preservation of an Anatolian nucleus instead of global imperial pretenses.

The Türk Yurdu Dergisi or the Journal of the Turkish Homeland was established in 1911 by Yusuf Akçura. This was the most important Turkist publication of the time, "in which, along with other Turkic exiles from Russia, [Akçura] attempted to instill a consciousness about the cultural unity of all Turkic peoples of the world."[11]

One of the most significant early exponents of pan-Turkism was Enver Pasha (1881–1922), the Ottoman Minister of War and acting Commander-in-Chief during World War I. He later became one of the leaders of the national-liberation Basmachi uprising (1916–1942) against the Russian Empire and Soviet Russian rule in Central Asia.

The last episode in the history of Pan-Turkism played out during WWII, when the Nazis attempted to undermine Soviet unity under a flag of Pan-Turkism in their fight with the USSR. The German intrigues, however, did not bear any results.[6]

While of little impact during much of the 20th century, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 20th century meant that the majority of the Turkic peoples were suddenly again able to exert considerable independence in business and political endeavours.

The aim of all Turks is to unite with the Turkic borders. History is affording us today the last opportunity. In order for the Islamic world not to be forever fragmented it is necessary that the campaign against Karabagh be not allowed to abate. As a matter of fact drive the point home in Azeri circles that the campaign should be pursued with greater determination and severity.[12]

Today, many new Pan-Turkic movements and organizations are concentrating on economic integration of the 7 sovereign Turkic states, and hope to achieve an economic-political union very similar to the European Union.

Turkey's role

Turkey has become a major business partner to many Central Asian Turkic states, helping with the reform of higher education, the introduction of the Latin alphabet, economic development and commerce.[citation needed] However, these efforts have not met the expectations of either the Turkic states nor the Pan-Turkist sentiment in Turkey. For example:

  • Housing projects of modest size promised to the Crimean Tatars have not been completed after many years.
  • Although Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan have switched to the Latin alphabet, their new alphabets are not as compatible with the Turkish alphabet as Turkey hoped. Kazakhstan considered switching to the Latin alphabet from Cyrillic, but abandoned the project in December 2007.[13] Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, has never seriously considered adopting the Latin alphabet – although the idea had been mooted among some politicians in the first few years of independence. Additionally, other problems persist, such as lack or delay of the printing and teaching materials.


Pan-Turkism is and has tended to be a movement viewed with suspicion by many, often perceived as nothing else but a new form of Turkish imperial ambition. Some view the movement as racist and chauvinistic, especially, because of the Young Turk leaders who saw Pan-Turkist ideologies as a way to reclaim the prestige that the Ottoman Empire once held.[14][15] Some scholars believe that Pan-Turkism was the guiding principle that led to ethnic cleansing such as the: Armenian Genocide, Greek genocide and Assyrian genocide.


Criticism among Turkic peoples

Some Turkic people consider that Pan-Turkism is a Turkish fascist policy that aimed to settle Turkish migrants in other Turkic-speaking countries and Turkey is a chauvinist country that performed many genocides and forced assimilation of ethnic minorities.[16] They resist Turkish policy to dominate in other Turkic-speaking countries.[16]

Genocide Connection

Pan-Turkism is seen as a possible direct cause for the Armenian Genocide[17] of 1915, in which Enver Pasha was involved, as an attempt to remove non-Muslim minorities from the late Ottoman Empire in order to foster a new Pan-Turkic state.[18][19] The Greek genocide[20] is a term used by some academics to refer to the fate of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire during and in the aftermath of World War I and the ensuing Greco-Turkish War from 1914 to 1923. Like Armenians and Assyrians, the Greeks were subjected to various forms of persecution including massacres, expulsions, and death marches by the Ottoman government.

George W. Rendel of the British Foreign Office, among other diplomats, noted the massacres and deportations of Greeks during the post-Armistice period.[21] It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Greeks may have died during this period as a result of these persecutions.[22] There were population exchanges between Greece and Turkey in 1923 after the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922). A majority of the exchange was unofficial, which made Turks and Greeks flee from Greece and Turkey respectively in a chaotic fashion. The chaotic nature of the population exchange left many people unaccounted for, which made some scholars assume a more brutal and ideologically motivated expulsion of Greeks from Turkey. Alongside the Armenian and Greek genocides, the Assyrian genocide took place at the hands of the Three Pashas regime of the Ottoman Empire.[23] By 1922, in a memorandum from the Assyro-Chaldean National Council, an estimate of approximately 275,000 Assyrians were killed.[23]

Nazi Germany and Pan-Turkism

In the 1940s, the Pan-Turkist also absorbed Nazi propaganda.[24][25] Nihal Atsız, a prominent ideologue, advocated Nazi doctrines while advocating a Hitler-style haircut and mustache. Alparslan Türkeş, a leading Pan-Turkist took a pro-Hitler position during the war[26] and established close connections with Nazi leaders in Germany.[27] Several pan-Turkic groups in Europe seemed to have maintained ties with Nazi Germany or its supporters at the start of the war, if not earlier.[28] The Turco-Tatars in Romania had cooperated with the Iron Guard, a Nazi inspired organization.[28] Although Turkish government archives for the period of WWII have not been released, the level of contact can be ascertained from accurately German archives.[28] During the early days of the War, publicly and officially, the government of Turkey maintained strict neutrality.[28] In practice, however, there has been confidential semi-official contacts between both Germany and in Turkey, since 1941.[28]

There was also great sympathy for Germany in Turkey at the time.[28] A ten-year Turco-German 'Treaty of Friendship' was signed in Ankara on 18 January.[28] A series of official and semi-official meeting of German ambassador to Ankara, Franz von Papen, and several other German officials on one side and Turkish officials including General H.E. Erkilet, himself of Tatar origin and frequent contributor to pan-Turkic journals took place in the second half of 1941 and early months of 1942.[28] Others included from the Turkish were General Ali Fuad Erdem, and Nuri Pasha, the brother of Enver Pasha, who is a romantic figure fore pan-Turkists.[28]

While Erkilet discussed military contingencies,[28] Nuri Pasha offered the Germans his plans for creating independent states which were to be allies but not satellites of Turkey.[28] These states were to be formed from the Turkic speaking population in Crimea, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, northwest Iran and northern Iraq.[28] Nuri Pasha himself offered to assist with propaganda activities to this effect. However, Turkey had also a fear for Turkic minorities of the USSR[28] and told von Papen that it could not join Germany until the USSR was crushed.[28] The Turkish government was possibly apprehensive of the USSR's might.[28] Thus various pressure failed to bring the Turkish government to join the war during the period.[28] At less official levels, emigrants from Turkic groups in the Soviet Union, played a crucial role in some of the negotiations and contacts of Turkey and Germany. Among these were pan-Turkic activists such as Zeki Velidi Togan, Mammed Amin Rasulzade, Mirza Bala, Ahmet CafarOglu, Sayid Shamil and Ayaz Ishaki.[28] Several Tatars, organized military units of Turkic speakers in Turco-Tatar and Caucasian regions from the prisoner of wars and these joined the war against the USSR, generally fighting as guerrillas.[28] Many of them imbued with hopes of independence and several of these units aspired for a pan-Turkic union.[28] The units which were continuously reinforced numbered several hundred thousands of people of Turkic origin.[28] What is clear is that Turkey adopted a cautious approach at the government level,[28] however pan-Turkist groups were exasperated by the Turkish government's inaction and by what they manifestly regarded as the waste of a golden opportunity in the realization of the goals of pan-Turkism.[28]


Pan-Turkism and nationalist historiography has been used to deny the identity of Armenians and Kurds. At the same time, various revisionist claims were made on ancient peoples of the region and beyond.

Turkic nationalist historiography and ideology

See also: Turkish nationalism and Azerbaijani nationalism


Pan-Turkist map


Pan-Turkist map


Pan-Turkist map

Most of the Turkic peoples settled in presesent-day territories during the Turkic migrations by assimilating or pushing previous settlers and issue of indigeneity is major problem for Turkic nationalist historiography and ideology. Many historical researches of Turkic writeres considered as falsifiactions.

Various non-Turkic groups and states including Parthians, Tocharians, Scythians, Wusuns, Sumerians, American Indians, Akkadians, Elamites, Anzani, Kassites, Carians, Protohittites, Hittites, Mittani, Hurrians, Assyria, Mongols, Hungarians, Székelys, Phoenicians, Irish people, Irish people, Basques, Urartu, Trojans, almost all of ancient and medieval Central Asian states except Tungusic, Tibetan and Tangut dynasties, Mongol Empire, Golden Horde, Chagatai Khanate, Ilkhanate, Northern Yuan, Four Oirat, and others have been claimed as of Turkic origin by nationalist writers.[29][30][31][32][33][34][35] They hold view that all great civilizations—Minoan, Chinese, Indian, Muslim, even ancient Egyptian, and Etruscan—were of Turkic origin".[36][35] Also US President Barack Obama claimed of Turkic origin by Kairat Zakiryanov, President of Kazakhstan Academy of Tourism and Sport, because Barak sultan of the Kazakh Middle juz and Barack Obama have same name.[32] K. Zakiryanov considers that gene pools among the Japanese and Kazakh populations are same.[32]

The Turkic nationalist writers trying to create another version of the Turkic migration theory and confirm that the Turkic peoples are indigenous population of Anatolia and other regions which later inhabited by the Turkic migrants (see Anatolianism). The essence of propaganda aims to prove that the ancient Turkic peoples arrived in unhabited territories or they continuously living in Anatolia, Central Asia and other regions since prehistoric times.

According to their view, almost whole prehistoric, ancient and medieval Central and Western Asia, and part of Eastern Europe have been inhabited by the Turkic people, from Anatolia to Northeast China and from tundra to Yellow River. [37] [38][39][40] Pan-Turkic writers consider that almost all of Central Asian and Southern Siberian archaeological cultures, and number of Eastern European and Western Asian archaeological cultures belong to the Turkic people.[37][38][39]

Turkic nationalist writers providing a propaganda that Eurocentrist colonial regime falsificated and divided their history profitably to above mentioned ethnicities so the Turkic peoples must return the "Turkic" territories inhabited by above mentioned peoples and restore historic justness.[30][41]

The Sun Language Theory that proposed that all human languages are descendants of one proto-Turkic primal language developed by Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1930s.

Some Turkic scientists trying to rewrite history of another Turkic people to glorify its nation. For example, in 2013 Kazakhstan's historian, turkologist and archeologist Karjaubai Sartkojauly proposed that Old Turkic alphabet written by the Kipchak language (language of the Kazakh people) but world scientists generally accepted that Old Turkic alphabet written by another Turkic languages.[42] Also in 2012 Kyrgyzstan's site accused Kazakhs and Uzbeks of stealing history of the Kyrgyzs.[43] Kyrgyz author says "If they need anything, they just steal it".

Many Uyghur people believe that Indo-European speaking Tocharians were direct ancestors of the Uyghurs[44] but world scholars do not consider the modern Uyghurs to be of direct linear descent from them and even the old Uyghur Khaganate.[45] Rather, they consider them to be descendants of a number of people, one of them the ancient Uyghurs because these three ethnic groups are linguistically and genetically very different.[46][47][48] Uyghur nationalism assosiates with rights of indigeneity in Xinjiang.

Turkmenistan's scientist O.Odekov suggests that an ancestor of the Scandinavians and Ainu people are Turkmens.[37]

In 2014 Kazakhstan's journalists informed that Kazakhstan's scientists and genealogists going to prove that Buddha has Kazakh origin.[49][50]

Viewpoint on Armenian history

Clive Foss, Professor of Ancient History at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, has done extensive archeological work in Turkey and is an expert on ancient Armenian coinage. In his article,"The Turkish View of Armenian History: A Vanishing Nation", he notes that the Turkish government had been "systematically changing the names of villages to make them more Turkish. Any name which does not have a meaning in Turkish, or does not sound Turkish, whatever its origin, is replaced by a banal name assigned by a bureau in Ankara, with no respect to local conditions or traditions".[51] He also notes that the Turkish government: "presented ambiguously, without clear identification of their builders, or as examples of the influence of the superiority of Turkish architecture. In all this, a clear line is evident: the Armenian presence is to be consigned, as far as possible, to oblivion".[51]

Among the books he criticizes, Foss notes that the book written in Turkey by Cemal Anadol and titled 1982: The Armenian File in the Light of History claims that the Iranian Scythians and Parthians as Turks. At the same time, Cemal Anadol claims that Armenians welcomed the Turks in the region, their language is a mixture with no roots, their alphabet is mixed, with 11 characters being from ancient Turkic alphabet. Clive Foss states that to call the Turkish revisionism on Armenian history as "historical revisionism" is an understatement, noting that "Turkish writings have been tendentious: history has been viewed as performing a useful service, proving or supporting a point of view, and so it is treated as something flexible which can be manipulated at will".[51]

He concludes with: "The notion, which seems well established in Turkey, that the Armenians were a wandering tribe without a home, who never had a state of their own, is of course entirely without foundation in fact. The logical consequence of the commonly expressed view of the Armenians is that they have no place in Turkey, and never did. The result would be the same if the viewpoint were expressed first, and the history written to order. In a sense, something like this seems to have happened, for most Turks who grew up under the Republic were educated to believe in the ultimate priority of Turks in all parts of history, and to ignore Armenians all together; they had been clearly cosigned to oblivion."[51]

Western Azerbaijan is an irredentist political concept that is used in the Republic of Azerbaijan mostly to refer to whole territory of the Republic of Armenia. Azerbaijani statements claim that the territory of the modern Armenian republic and Nagorno-Karabakh were lands that once belonged to Azerbaijanis.[52] Its claims are primarily hinged over the contention that the current Armenian territory was under the rule of various Turkic tribes and states from the late medieval period until the Treaty of Turkmenchay signed after the Russo-Persian War, 1826-1828. The concept has received official sanction by the government of Azerbaijan, and has been used by its current president, Ilham Aliyev, who has repeatedly stated that the territory of Armenia is a part of "ancient Turk and Azerbaijani land.

The Turkish and Azerbaijan's historians claim that Armenians are not indigenous but alien in the Caucasus and Anatolia.[53][54][55][56][57]

Ideologue views on pan-Turkism

Ziya Gökalp redefined pan-Turkism as a cultural, academic, philosophical[58] and political[59] concept advocating the unity and freedom of Turkic peoples.

Tsarist Russia and Soviet viewpoint on pan-Turkism

Generally, the concept of Turkism was interpreted by Tsarist Russian circles as overwhelmingly political, irredentist and aggressive.[60] The term "Turkism" started to be used with a prefix "Pan" (from Greek meaning "all"), to create "Panturkism". The Turkic peoples of Russia began to be threatened with Turkish expansion, I. Gasprinsky and his adherents were labeled "Turkish spies". After the revolution of 1917, the attitude to Türkism did not differ from the attitude of the Imperial powers. At the 10th congress of Bolshevik Communist Party in 1921 was formulated the official doctrine where the party "condemned Panturkism as a sloping to the bourgeois-democratic nationalism". The emergence of a "Panturkism" scare in the Soviet propaganda caused "Panturkism" to become one of the most frightening political labels in the USSR. The most widespread accusation used for fatal repressions in the 1930s of the educated Tatars and other Turkic peoples was the accusation in "Panturkism".[61]

Russia, China and Iran, claim that they perceive Panturkism as nothing else but a new form of Turkish imperial ambition. Some see it as downright racist, particularly when considering the associated racial and historical teachings. Critics also believe that the concept of Pan-Turkism is flawed because of the distinct dialects among each different Turkic people, which sometimes led to problems of understanding between people speaking different Turkic language. There is also concern over religious differences too. Although most Turks follow the Sunni sect of Islam, the Azeris of Azerbaijan are distinct in that they follow the Shi'a school. Some nationalist critics also claim that Pan-Turkists are at the fore front of major historical revisionism regarding Turkic history and world history in general.[62] Still, proponents see Pan-Turkism as a way of increasing regional security, economic growth and as a viable bulwark against Islamist movements, by furthering secular and democratic government in the region.[citation needed]

Notable Pan-Turkists


"Dilde, fikirde, işte birlik" translated "Unity of Language, Thought and Action" by Ismail Gasprinski, 1839 a Crimean Tatar and famous member of the Turanian Society

  • "Bu yürüyüş devam ediyor. Türk orduları ata ruhlarının dolaştığı Altay ve Tanrı Dağları eteklerinde geçit resmi yapıncaya kadar devam edecektir." translated "This march is going on. It will continue until the Turkic Armies' parade on the foothills of Altai and Tien-Shan mountains where the souls of their ancestors stroll." Hüseyin Nihâl Atsız, a famous Pan-Turkist.

See also


Jump up ^ Fishman, Joshua; Garcia, Ofelia (2011). Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity: The Success-Failure Continuum in Language and Ethnic Identity Efforts 2. Oxford University Press. p. 269. ISBN 978-0-19-539245-6. It is commonly acknowledged that pan-Turkism, the movement aiming at the political and/or cultural unification of all Turkic peoples, emerged among Turkic intellectuals of Russia as a liberal-cultural movement in the 1880s.

1.                               Jump up ^ "Pan-Turkism". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Retrieved 19 Jul 2009. Political movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which had as its goal the political union of all Turkish-speaking peoples in the Ottoman Empire, Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan. 

2.                               Jump up ^ Landau, Jacob (1995). Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism To Cooperation. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-20960-3

3.                               Jump up ^ Jacob M. Landau, "Radical Politics in Modern Turkey", BRILL, 1974.

4.                               Jump up ^ Robert F. Melson, "The Armenian Genocide" in Kevin Reilly (Editor), Stephen Kaufman (Editor), Angela Bodino (Editor) "Racism: A Global Reader (Sources and Studies in World History)", M.E. Sharpe (January 2003). pg 278:"Concluding that their liberal experiment had been a failure, CUP leaders turned to Pan-Turkism, a xenophobic and chauvinistic brand of nationalism that sought to create a new empire based on Islam and Turkish ethnicity."

5.                               ^ Jump up to: a b Iskander Gilyazov, "Пантюрκизм, Пантуранизм и Германия", magazine "Татарстан" No 5-6, 1995. (Russian)

6.                               Jump up ^ Mansur Hasanov, Academician of Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan Republic, "Великий реформатор", in magazine "Республика Татарстан" № 96–97 (24393-24394), 17 May 2001. (Russian)

7.                               Jump up ^ Pan-Turkism – Britannica Online Encyclopedia

8.                               Jump up ^ Rafael Khakimov, "Taklid and Ijtihad", Russia in Global Affairs, Dec. 2003.

9.                               Jump up ^ N.N., "Полтора Века Пантюрκизма в Турции", magazine "Панорама". (Russian)

10.                           ^ Jump up to: a b c Modernism: The Creation of Nation States. p. 218. Retrieved 13 August 2014. 

11.                           Jump up ^ Karabekir, Istiklâl Harbimiz/n.2/, p. 631

12.                           Jump up ^ "Kazakhstan Will Not Change Constitution’s Language Principles". 15 September 2011. Retrieved 13 February 2012. 

13.                           Jump up ^ Jacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. India University Press, 1995. 2nd Edition. pg 45: "Pan-Turkism's historic chance arrived shortly before and during First World War, when it was adopted a guiding principle of state policy by an influential group among the Young Turks"

14.                           Jump up ^ Robert F. Melson, "The Armenian Genocide" in Kevin Reilly (Editor), Stephen Kaufman (Editor), Angela Bodino (Editor) "Racism: A Global Reader (Sources and Studies in World History)", M.E. Sharpe (January 2003). pg 278: "Concluding that their liberal experiment had been a failure, CUP leaders turned to Pan-Turkism, a xenophobic and chauvinistic brand of nationalism that sought to create a new empire based on Islam and Turkish ethnicity." ..."It was in this context of revolutionary and ideological transformation and war that the fateful decision to destroy the Armenians was taken.

15.                           ^ Jump up to: a b Пантюркизм как идеология фашизма

16.                           Jump up ^ The International Association of Genocide Scholars, Affirmation, Armenian Genocide, "That this assembly of the Association of Genocide Scholars in its conference held in Montreal, June 11–3, 1997, reaffirms that the mass murder of Armenians in Turkey in 1915 is a case of genocide which conforms to the statutes of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. It further condemns the denial of the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish government and its official and unofficial agents and supporters".

17.                           Jump up ^ Young Turks and the Armenian Genocide, Armenian National Institute

18.                           Jump up ^ Robert Melson, Leo Kuper, "Revolution and genocide: on the origins of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust", University of Chicago Press, 1996. pg 139: "It was in this context of exclusion and war that CUP made a decision to destroy the Armenians as a viable national community in Turkey and the pan-Turkic empire. Thus a revolutionary transformation of ideology and identity for the majority had dangerous implications for the minority. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Turkish nationalists revolution, as initiated by the Young Turks, set the stage for the Genocide of Armenians during the Great war"

19.                           Jump up ^ Assyrian International News Agency, International Genocide Scholars Association Officially Recognizes Assyrian, Greek Genocides, Retrieved on 2007-12-15.

20.                           Jump up ^ Foreign Office Memorandum by Mr. G.W. Rendel on Turkish Massacres and Persecutions of Minorities since the Armistice (20 March 1922)

21.                           Jump up ^ R. J. Rummel. "Statistics of Democide". Chapter 5, Statistics Of Turkey's Democide Estimates, Calculations, And Sources. Retrieved 2006-10-04. 

22.                           ^ Jump up to: a b Samuel Totten, Paul Robert Bartrop, Steven L. Jacobs, "Dictionary of Genocide",Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008. pp 25–26

23.                           Jump up ^ Jacob M. Landau, "Radical Politics in Modern Turkey", BRILL, 1974. pg 194: "In the course of Second World War, various circles in Turkey absorbed Nazi propaganda; these were pro-German and admired Nazism, which they grasped as a doctrine of warlike dynamism and a source of national inspiration, on which to base their pan-Turkic and anti-Soviet ideology"

24.                           Jump up ^ John M. VanderLippe , "The politics of Turkish democracy", SUNY Press, 2005. "A third group was led by Nihal Atsiz, who favored a Hitler style haircut and mustache, and advocated racist Nazi doctorine"

25.                           Jump up ^ Peter Davies, Derek Lynch, "The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right", Routledge, 2002. pg 244: "Alparslan Türkeş: Leader of a Turkish neo-fascist movement, Nationalist Action Party(MHP). During the war he took a pro-Hitler position and was imprisoned after a 1960 coup attempt against his country's ruler.

26.                           Jump up ^ Berch Berberoglu, " Turkey in crisis: from state capitalism to neocolonialism", Zed, 1982. 2nd edition. pg 125: "Turkes established close ties with Nazi leaders in Germany in 1945 "

27.                           ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v Jacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. India University Press, 1995. 2nd Edition. pp 112–114.

28.                           Jump up ^ Speros Vyronis, Jr., The Turkish State and History: Clio Meets the Grey Wolf. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies. 1991.

29.                           ^ Jump up to: a b Мухаметдинов Р.Ф. "ТЮРКИ И АТЛАНТИДА"

30.                           Jump up ^ President Kazakh NUSF publishes New Book

31.                           ^ Jump up to: a b c К.Закирьянов. Я вполне допускаю мысль, что в жилах Обамы течет тюркская кровь (Russian)

32.                           Jump up ^ Talat Tekin

33.                           Jump up ^ Mirfatyh Zakiev Origin of Türks and Tatars

34.                           ^ Jump up to: a b Мустафа (Кемаль) Ататюрк

35.                           Jump up ^ Lynn Meskell, "Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East", Routledge, 1998.

36.                           ^ Jump up to: a b c Туркмены - предки ацтеков, инков, древних шумеров и суровых норвежцев

37.                           ^ Jump up to: a b Гиперборея

38.                           ^ Jump up to: a b K.Zakiryanov "Under the Wolf's nest. A Turkic Rhapsody"

39.                           Jump up ^ Zakiryanov launches latest book on history of Kazakhstan

40.                           Jump up ^ Доктор истнаук А.Галиев: "Покажите мне паспорт Чингисхана, где написано, что он казах. Тогда я вам поверю

41.                           Jump up ^ Казахстанские ученые сделали новое открытие в истории тюрков

42.                           Jump up ^ Казахи интересуются нашей историей

43.                           Jump up ^ Мумии индоариев, найденные в Китае

44.                           Jump up ^ Nabijan Tursun. "The Formation of Modern Uyghur Historiography and Competing Perspectives toward Uyghur History". The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 6 (3): 87–100. 

45.                           Jump up ^ James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue (2004). "Chapter 2: Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century". In S. Frederick Starr. Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland. M. E. Sharpe. pp. 40–41. ISBN 978-0-7656-1318-9

46.                           Jump up ^ Susan J. Henders (2006). Susan J. Henders, ed. Democratization and Identity: Regimes and Ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia. Lexington Books. p. 135. ISBN 0-7391-0767-4. Retrieved 2011-09-09. 

47.                           Jump up ^ Reed, J. Todd; Raschke, Diana (2010). The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat. ABC-CLIO. p. 7. ISBN 0313365407

48.                           Jump up ^ Казахстанские журналисты намерены доказать наличие у Будды казахских корней

49.                           Jump up ^ Казахстанские журналисты намерены доказать наличие у Будды казахских корней

50.                           ^ Jump up to: a b c d Clive Foss, “The Turkish View of Armenian History: A Vanishing Nation,” in The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), p. 268.

51.                           Jump up ^ "Present-day Armenia located in ancient Azerbaijani lands - Ilham Aliyev". News.Az. October 16, 2010. 

52.                           Jump up ^ Tofig Kocharli "Armenian Deception"

53.                           Jump up ^ Ohannes Geukjian "Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy"

54.                           Jump up ^ NAGORNO KARABAKH: ACCENT ON HISTORY

55.                           Jump up ^ Рауф Гусейн-заде: "Мы показали, что армяне на Кавказе - некоренные жители"

56.                           Jump up ^ Professor Firidun Agasyoglu Jalilov "How Hays became Armenians"

57.                           Jump up ^ Gökalp, Ziya; Devereaux, Robert (1968). The Principles of Turkism. E. J. Brill. p. 125. Turkism is not a political party but a scientific, philosophic and aesthetic school of thought.

58.                           Jump up ^ Kieser, Hans-Lukas (2006). Turkey beyond nationalism: towards post-nationalist identities. I. B. Tauris. p. 19. ISBN 978-1-84511-141-0

59.                           Jump up ^ Geraci, Robert P. (2001). Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia. Cornell University Press. p. 278. ISBN 978-0-8014-3422-8

60.                           Jump up ^ Mansur Hasanov, Academician of Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan republic, in "People's Political Newspaper" № 96–97 (24393-24394) 17 May 2001

61.                           Jump up ^ Pan-Turanianism Takes Aim at Azerbaijan: A Geopolitical Agenda By: Dr. Kaveh Farrokh

Further reading

Jacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Hurst, 1995. ISBN 1-85065-269-4


Armenian Genocide


Greek genocide


Assyrian genocide

List of massacres in Turkey



From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


See also: Iranian nationalism and Greater Iran



Geographically and culturally, Greater Iran is generally acknowledged to include the entire Iranian plateau and its bordering plains,[1] extending from Mesopotamia and the Caucasus in the west, to the Indus River in the east, and from the Oxus River in the north to the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman in the south.

Pan-Iranism is an ideology that advocates solidarity and reunification of Iranian peoples living in the Iranian plateau and other regions that have significant Iranian cultural influence, including the Ossetians, Kurds, Tajiks of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and the Pashtuns and Baluchis of Pakistan. Virtually all[dubiousdiscuss] Pan-Iranists also include the Azeris, who although speaking a Turkic language, are partly or mostly of native Iranian descent, and the overwhelming majority of whom are bilingual in the Persian language. The first theoretician was Dr Mahmoud Afshar Yazdi.[2][3][4][5][6][7]


Origins and ideology

Iranian political scientist Dr. Mahmoud Afshar developed the Pan-Iranist ideology in the early 1920s in opposition to Pan-Turkism and Pan-Arabism, which were seen as potential threats to the territorial integrity of Iran.[8] He also displayed a strong belief in the nationalist character of Iranian people throughout the country’s long history.[8]

Unlike similar movements of the time in other countries, Pan-Iranism was ethnically and linguistically inclusive and solely concerned with territorial nationalism, rather than ethnic or racial nationalism.[9] On the eve of World War I, pan-Turkist propaganda focused on the Turkic-speaking lands of Iran, Caucasus and Central Asia.[10] The ultimate purpose was to persuade these populations to secede from the larger political entities to which they belonged and join the new pan-Turkic homeland.[10] It was the latter appeal to Iranian Azerbaijanis, which, contrary to Pan-Turkist intentions, caused a small group of Azerbaijani intellectuals to become the strongest advocates of the territorial integrity of Iran.[10] After the constitutional revolution in Iran, a romantic nationalism was adopted by Azerbaijani Democrats as a reaction to the pan-Turkist irredentist policies threatening Iran’s territorial integrity.[10] It was during this period that Iranism and linguistic homogenization policies were proposed as a defensive nature against all others.[10] Contrary to what one might expect, foremost among innovating this defensive nationalism were Iranian Azerbaijanis.[10] They viewed that assuring the territorial integrity of the country was the first step in building a society based on law and a modern state.[10] Through this framework, their political loyalty outweighed their ethnic and regional affiliations.[10] The adoption of these integrationist policies paved the way for the emergence of the titular ethnic group’s cultural nationalism.[10]



Flag of the Pan-Iranist Party

With the collapse of the Qajar dynasty, which had descended into corruption, and the rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925, who began introducing secular reforms limiting the power of the Shia clergy, Iranian nationalist and socialist thinkers had hoped that this new era would also witness the introduction of democratic reforms. However, such reforms did not take place. This culminated in the gradual rise of a loosely organized grass roots Pan-Iranist movement made up of nationalist writers, teachers, students, and activists allied with other pro-democracy movements.

In the 1940s, following the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, the Pan-Iranist movement gained momentum and popularity as a result of the widespread feeling of insecurity among Iranians who saw the king, Reza Shah, powerless against such foreign presence in the country. There were soldiers from Russia, England, India, New Zealand, Australia and later on, America, present in the country, especially in the capital, Tehran.[11] The Allied occupation influenced a series of student movements in 1941. One of these new groups was an underground nationalist guerrilla group called the Revenge group, also known as the Anjoman.[11] The Pan-Iranist Party was founded later on by two of the members of the Revenge group and two other students in the mid-to-late 1940s in Tehran University. Though the pan-Iranist movement had been active throughout the 1930s, it had been a loosely organized grass roots alliance of nationalist writers, teachers, students, and activists. The party was the first organization to officially adopt the pan-Iranist position, which believed in the solidarity and reunification of the Iranian peoples inhabiting the Iranian plateau. In 1951, the party leaders Mohsen Pezeshkpour and Dariush Forouhar came to a disagreement as to how the party should operate, and a division occurred. The two factions greatly differed in their organizational structure and practice. The Pezeskpour faction, which retained the party name, believed in working within the system of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Forouhar faction, which adopted a new name, Mellat Iran (Nation of Iran Party), believed in working against the system.[11]


Iran-e Kabir was a periodical published in the city of Rasht by the political activist Grigor Yaqikiān (d. January 1951). It advocated the unification of Iranian peoples (e.g., Afghans, Kurds, etc.), who, in Yaqikian's view, included the Armenians. Yaqikiān believed that, with education and the rising of the levels of people’s awareness, such a goal was feasible through peaceful means. The journal benefited from the contributions of a number of leading intellectuals of the time, including Moḥammad Moin and Ali Esfandiāri (Nimā Yušij), and carried articles, poetry, a serialized story, and some news. It also published articles in support of the Kurds who had risen in rebellion in Turkey, which caused the protest of the Turkish counsel in Rasht and led to the banning of the paper by the order of the minister of court. Yaqikiān tried, without success, to have the ban removed and eventually moved to Tehran, where he published the paper Irān-e Konuni.[12]

See also

Further reading


1.                               Jump up ^ "IRAN i. LANDS OF IRAN". Encyclopædia Iranica

2.                               Jump up ^ Professor Richard Frye states:The Turkish speakers of Azerbaijan are mainly descended from the earlier Iranian speakers, several pockets of whom still exist in the region (Frye, Richard Nelson, “Peoples of Iran”, in Encyclopedia Iranica).

3.                               Jump up ^ Swietochowski, Tadeusz. “ AZERBAIJAN , REPUBLIC OF”,., Vol. 3, Colliers Encyclopedia CD-ROM, 02-28-1996: “The original Persian population became fused with the Turks, and gradually the Persian language was supplanted by a Turkic dialect that evolved into the distinct Azerbaijani language.”

4.                               Jump up ^ Golden, P.B. “An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples”,Otto Harrosowitz, 1992. “The Azeris of today are an overwhelmingly sedentary, detribalized people. Anthropologically, they are little distinguished from the Iranian neighbo”

5.                               Jump up ^ Xavier Planhol, “Lands of Iran” in Encyclopedia Iranica. Excerpt: The toponyms, with more than half of the place names of Iranian origin in some areas, such as the Sahand, a huge volcanic massif south of Tabriz, or the Qara Dagh, near the border (Planhol, 1966, p. 305; Bazin, 1982, p. 28) bears witness to this continuity. The language itself provides eloquent proof. Azeri, not unlike Uzbek (see above), lost the vocal harmony typical of Turkish languages. It is a Turkish language learned and spoken by Iranian peasants.”(Encyclopedia Iranica, “Lands of Iran”)

6.                               Jump up ^ “Thus Turkish nomads, in spite of their deep penetration throughout Iranian lands, only slightly influenced the local culture. Elements borrowed by the Iranians from their invaders were negligible.”(X.D. Planhol, LANDS OF IRAN in Encyclopedia Iranica)

7.                               Jump up ^ История Востока. В 6 т. Т. 2. Восток в средние века. Глава V. — М.: «Восточная литература», 2002. — ISBN 5-02-017711-3 . Excerpt: ""Говоря о возникновении азербайджанской культуры именно в XIV-XV вв., следует иметь в виду прежде всего литературу и другие части культуры, органически связанные с языком. Что касается материальной культуры, то она оставалась традиционной и после тюркизации местного населения. Впрочем, наличие мощного пласта иранцев, принявших участие в формировании азербайджанского этноса, наложило свой отпечаток прежде всего на лексику азербайджанского языка, в котором огромное число иранских и арабских слов. Последние вошли и в азербайджанский, и в турецкий язык главным образом через иранское посредство. Став самостоятельной, азербайджанская культура сохранила тесные связи с иранской и арабской. Они скреплялись и общей религией, и общими культурно-историческими традициями." (History of the East. 6 v. 2. East during the Middle Ages. Chapter V. - M.: «Eastern literature», 2002. - ISBN 5-02-017711-3.). Translation:"However, the availability of powerful layer of Iranians took part in the formation of the Azerbaijani ethnic group, left their mark primarily in the Azerbaijani language, in which a great number of Iranian and Arabic words. The latter included in the Azeri, and Turkish language primarily through Iranian mediation."

8.                               ^ Jump up to: a b AHMAD ASHRAF, "IRANIAN IDENTITY IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES", Encyclopedia Iranica. Also accessible here:[1]. Excerpt: "Afšār, a political scientist, pioneered systematic scholarly treatment of various aspects of Iranian national identity, territorial integrity, and national unity. An influential nationalist, he also displayed a strong belief in the nationalist character of Iranian people throughout the country’s long history. He was the first to propose the idea of Pan-Iranism to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of the nation against the onslaught of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Arabism (Afšār, p. 187)"

9.                               Jump up ^ Perspectives on Iranian identity, pg.26

10.                           ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i Touraj Atabaki, “Recasting Oneself, Rejecting the Other: Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism” in Van Schendel, Willem(Editor). Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century. London, GBR: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2001. Actual Quote:

As far as Iran is concerned, it is widely argued that Iranian nationalism was born as a state ideology in the Reza Shah era, based on philological nationalism and as a result of his innovative success in creating a modern nation-state in Iran. However, what is often neglected is that Iranian nationalism has its roots in the political upheavals of the nineteenth century and the disintegration immediately following the Constitutional revolution of 1905– 9. It was during this period that Iranism gradually took shape as a defensive discourse for constructing a bounded territorial entity – the ‘pure Iran’ standing against all others. Consequently, over time there emerged among the country’s intelligentsia a political xenophobia which contributed to the formation of Iranian defensive nationalism. It is noteworthy that, contrary to what one might expect, many of the leading agents of the construction of an Iranian bounded territorial entity came from non Persian-speaking ethnic minorities, and the foremost were the Azerbaijanis, rather than the nation’s titular ethnic group, the Persians.


In the middle of April 1918, the Ottoman army invaded Azerbaijan for the second time.


Contrary to their expectations, however, the Ottomans did not achieve impressive success in Azerbaijan. Although the province remained under quasi-occupation by Ottoman troops for months, attempting to win endorsement for pan-Turkism ended in failure.


The most important political development affecting the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century was the collapse of the Ottoman and the Russian empires. The idea of a greater homeland for all Turks was propagated by pan-Turkism, which was adopted almost at once as a main ideological pillar by the Committee of Union and Progress and somewhat later by other political caucuses in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. On the eve of World War I, pan-Turkist propaganda focused chiefly on the Turkic-speaking peoples of the southern Caucasus, in Iranian Azerbaijan and Turkistan in Central Asia, with the ultimate purpose of persuading them all to secede from the larger political entities to which they belonged and to join the new pan-Turkic homeland. Interestingly, it was this latter appeal to Iranian Azerbaijanis which, contrary to pan-Turkist intentions, caused a small group of Azerbaijani intellectuals to become the most vociferous advocates of Iran’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. If in Europe ‘romantic nationalism responded to the damage likely to be caused by modernism by providing a new and larger sense of belonging, an all-encompassing totality, which brought about new social ties, identity and meaning, and a new sense of history from one’s origin on to an illustrious future’,(42) in Iran after the Constitutional movement romantic nationalism was adopted by the Azerbaijani Democrats as a reaction to the irredentist policies threatening the country’s territorial integrity. In their view, assuring territorial integrity was a necessary first step on the road to establishing the rule of law in society and a competent modern state which would safeguard collective as well as individual rights. It was within this context that their political loyalty outweighed their other ethnic or regional affinities. The failure of the Democrats in the arena of Iranian politics after the Constitutional movement and the start of modern state-building paved the way for the emergence of the titular ethnic group’s cultural nationalism. Whereas the adoption of integrationist policies preserved Iran’s geographic integrity and provided the majority of Iranians with a secure and firm national identity, the blatant ignoring of other demands of the Constitutional movement, such as the call for formation of society based on law and order, left the country still searching for a political identity.

11.                           ^ Jump up to: a b c Engheta, Naser (2001). 50 years history with the Pan-Iranists. Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp. ISBN 1-883819-56-3

12.                           Jump up ^ "IRAN-E KABIR – Encyclopaedia Iranica". 

External links



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